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The Impact of the Washington
Consensus on Democratic Stability:
The case of Ethiopia
iN ThE 21sT CENTURY structural adjustment has been reformulated 
within the developing world to achieve poverty reduction by imple-
menting donor and local elite negotiated poverty reduction strategy 
papers (PRsPs) and also to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals (hereafter MDGs). 
in the case of Africa, many states are expected to be able to meet 
these two objectives. The twenty year period of structural adjustment 
is supposed to have prepared them to meet these goals. The question 
is whether structural adjustment has been conceptualised in a neces-
sary and/or sufficient way to help meet these goals? The answer is of 
course no. The main weakness of the structural adjustment approach 
coming from the Washington institutions is the rupture of the econo-
my from politics. one of the key weaknesses of the structural adjust-
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ment ideology is the sufferance of what karl Polyani calls the rupture 
or disembedding of the economy from society. The economy was con-
ceived separately from the politics that should guide it. The market is 
seen as a technical instrument devoid of political implications. The 
economy was supposed to be managed technocratically and politics 
was to enter into the economy adjusting itself to serve mainly narrow 
economic goals dictated by market and private relations. by applying 
this twisted logic, a process was set where autonomy and accountabil-
ity, growth and redistribution and consensus and inclusiveness moved 
in opposite or bifurcated directions.
Structurally Adjusted Good Governance
vs. Democratic Governance?
The case of Ethiopia illustrates this dilemma emanating from struc-
tural adjustment policies. i shall illustrate the point by taking the issue 
of governance. it is a truism that poverty eradication without a founda-
tion in democratic governance will unravel or will not be irreversible. 
only democratic governance and not what is often sold as ‘good gov-
ernance’ provides the necessary condition for doing away structurally 
with poverty at the root. The difference between democratic governance 
and good governance is significant. The donors invented what they call 
‘good governance’ and mean by it anything but democratic capacitating 
of citizens. by good governance, they stress very often authoritarian 
managerial ability such as: capacity to repress a people to keep law and 
order with authoritarianism, technocratic ability to implement donor-
local elite negotiated agenda such as the so-called poverty reductions 
strategy papers and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As long as 
a regime controls the people and is willing to follow the foreign policy 
of the major donors, it can even qualify for special ally status. This has 
been the way the so-called ‘new generation leaders’ have been selected 
in Africa, not how democratic they are to their people, but how ‘good’ 
and receptive they are to the donors. it is the donors that dubbed them 
as ‘new generation leaders’ and not their own people! None of them are 
qualified as ‘new’ for practising any form of democratic governance. it is 
their volunteered ‘commitment to poverty reduction, economic growth 
and support to global security interests’ that have been considered for 
their positive evaluation, graduation and qualification. And they have 
been feted and given generous budget support despite the fact they have 
been violating human rights, repressing the people and violating the 
rule of law and basic freedoms in their societies.
in some cases of ‘good governance’, donors recommend what they 
call civil society oversight of the state. but the sort of civil society that 
gets invited or selected to do the oversight is often loyal to the regime 
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and makes often inconsequential criticisms. it has been used to fore-
stall real participation by the appearance or form and not the content 
of real popular participation and inscription of people’s interest in the 
state. Loyal civil society is often recruited to legitimise authoritarian 
action by undemocratic regimes and injures real democratic progress 
by postponing the participation of the people under the guise that they 
have representatives that are assumed to carry out oversight of the 
state, regardless of whether the agents such as NGos from civil society 
represent constituencies or not.
standing for, and qualifying for democratic governance is a wholly 
different conceptual matter vis a vis standing and qualifying for good 
governance. The opposite of good governance is bad governance. Good 
and bad in relation to governance connotes degrees in capacities to gov-
ern. That ability can be with or without democratic accountability and 
legitimacy. it connotes degrees of effectiveness and capacities based on 
criteria that may or may not include democratic dispensation. 
The opposite of democratic governance is either non- or/and anti-
democratic governance. This explicitly factors in democracy as the 
bedrock for measuring the effectiveness and capability of governance. 
This is not thus a semantic quibble. it relates to a substantial way by 
which donors frame the politics and economics of the governance of 
the development process. 
Democratic governance is based on people’s choice. it puts at the 
centre people and their real and effective presence or participation 
in Government directly or through their legitimate representatives. 
Good governance centres elite capacity to govern and manage eco-
nomic growth. it focuses more on the economy and security rather 
than politics and democratic development in a country. in democratic 
governance, legitimacy comes from people and society and not exter-
nal donors. Democratic governance stresses political capacity based 
on people’s voices and choices and not authoritarian managerial and 
technocratic ability to employ authoritarian methods to deal with 
poverty. Democracy capacitates the citizen, the society and the peo-
ple by making the state accountable. Democratic Governance shuns 
authoritarianism and celebrates democratic accountability to the rule 
of law and human rights and the protection of basic freedoms. The 
major donors have been often lukewarm to democratic governance 
and quick to prefer and advocate what they describe as ‘good govern-
ance’, in the form of what they often describe as capacity building. 
Democratic governance capacitates the individual, the society and the 
people and the nation. Dictatorship in Africa debilitates, while democ-
racy can revitalise and infuse life with a spirit of freedom to create, 
imagine and make futures.
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Meeting MDGs?
is Ethiopia or for that matter, indeed much of Africa on target to meet 
the MDGs? According to a 2005 report by the iMF and World bank, 
the prospect that the MDGs would be met by 2015 appears dim. so 
what does it mean when World bank officials claim that the regime in 
Ethiopia is committed to poverty reduction and meeting MDGs? Why is 
it that Ethiopia is still a food-dependent economy? how can a country 
be truly sovereign when it begs the most essential matter of all-food for 
the people in a country that has enough arable land to feed not only 
itself but even much of the people in the Middle East? What kind of 
economic management and capacity has this regime? We know it has a 
capacity to kill, but to create economy and food security after 15 years 
in power, that we have not seen, much as we would like to.
Even when donors laud success, it is often at the expense or loss 
of what will build an African national economy. Take the case of the 
cut flower market. Donors laud economies like Ethiopia’s entering the 
cut-flower market. The weird thing about it is that a lot of the East 
African economies are involved in this cut-flower business. The source 
for the cultured seed for the flowers comes from holland. Donors talk 
about how these economies are on the move and the example of suc-
cess that was bandied about is cut-flower. What is interesting is that 
large arable land is devoted in all these regions to this business and 
the seed producer has the last laugh creating many sources for pro-
duction thus creating reduction in prices prompting each economy to 
increase the volume of production. is this sensible economic manage-
ment? Whatever happens to African regional integration when econo-
mies not only compete for the same markets on primary commodities, 
but also on value added manufactures? in Ethiopia who benefits from 
this trade and who owns the cut-flower business? That is yet another 
matter donors do not see before they praise a regime on its success in 
the cut flower business.
Poverty Reduction?
The story of the regime’s commitment to poverty reduction is no dif-
ferent from the failure to meet MDGs. Even if this donor assessment 
of the regime’s assumed commitment to poverty reduction were to be 
taken at face value, commitment to poverty reduction should not be 
used to deny commitment to democracy. in fact if a government is not 
able to resource self-reliantly poverty reduction, deploy institutions, 
put in place systems and incentives, and implement policies based 
on democratic legitimacy, there is no doubt the commitment to pov-
erty reduction would end up being shallow or even misguided. it is 
to be disingenuous by donors to repeat the commitment of the Meles 
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regime to poverty reduction while watering down the much needed 
donor understanding and resolute stand on the side of the people 
that revealed their own agency for democratic governance on May 
15, 2005 so splendidly. it is not simply enough to praise tyrants who 
kill and exonerate their dictatorial sins for their subservience to ideas 
for poverty reduction that are doomed not to lead to an irreversible 
eradication of poverty from Ethiopian soil by launching a simultane-
ous white revolution (milk production), blue revolution (water pro-
duction) and green revolution (agricultural food production) in the 
Ethiopian country side. Deep democracy is the necessary foundation 
for the eradication of poverty in Ethiopia by creating the legitimacy to 
undertake the much over due green, blue and white revolutions in the 
world of the Ethiopian country side.
Concluding remark
Donors must understand that poverty reduction by itself does not 
make regimes democratic no matter how much this is repeated in 
their rhetoric. The distinction between ‘good’ and democratic govern-
ance remains critically important conceptually and in relation to the 
implications to policy decisions and implementation strategies. To 
overlook the distinction is tantamount to fighting democracy itself in 
Africa under the guise of fighting poverty. Dyed in the wool tyrants 
in Africa are tolerated when they must be fought and told off in no 
uncertain terms for violating democracy because they are assumed 
committed to poverty reduction (mind you not poverty eradication!) 
Unfortunately, the donors are trapped by their own discourse of pre-
ferring to subordinate democratic governance to regimes’ gratuitous 
claims of commitment to poverty reduction and meeting the MDGs. 
This donor argument does not stand up to critical scrutiny, and un-
fortunately makes their feeble stand against tyranny to be politically, 
morally and intellectually susceptible.
The donors must not rupture commitment to democracy and 
commitment to poverty reduction and meeting MDGs, if they wish 
to be politically, morally and intellectually sensitive and consistent. 
That requires they learn to be different actors, which is not easy to 
be. They learn to ditch the Washington consensus which is easier said 
than done.
